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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

fendant was driving a truck and saw the plaintiff approaching
the street at some distance away. Defendant estimated that he
could "get by" since she was walking slowly. Just as he
reached her, however, she quickened her pace and he struck her.
The court allowed a recovery under the doctrine of last chance.
Fourth. Where the plaintiff's negligence continues up to the
time of the accident; defendant is not aware of the plaintiff's
danger, but by the exercise of due care could have discovered it
in time to have avoided the injury and fails to do so.
Missouri has probably gone further than any other state in allowing a recovery in such cases where there is a duty on the
part of the defendant to discover the plaintiff. It would seem in
such cases, however, that the parties at the most, have an equal
opportunity of averting the accident, and the negligence is concurrent. West Virginia in the dictum laid down in McLeod v.
Laundry Company, supra, would seem to allow a recovery. The
rule, however, being dictum, may not be followed to this extent.
By way of summary, then, we find that the West Virginia court
applies the doctrine of last chance; first, where defendant has
knowledge of plaintiff's peril, either when the plaintiff's negligence has terminated or is still active; and second, where the
defendant does not know of the plaintiff's peril but by the exercise of due care could have discovered it in time to have avoided
the accident, when the plaintiff's negligence has ceased; and, according to the dictum in McLeod v. Charleston Laundry Company,
even when the negligence is still active.
HAmm L. FREoH.

TRUSTS-EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAuDs.-In

a recent

West Virginia case, Carter v. Carter,' the court held that exstate.
press trusts are not subject to the statute of frauds in this
VirWest
in
law
the
is
what
to
as
This again raises the question
of
statute
English
the
of
section
.seventh
the
to
ginia in regard
or
trusts
of
creations
or
declarations
all
that
states
frauds which
proved
be
to
hereditaments
or
tenements
land,
any
in
confidences
in some writing signed by the party, enabled to declare such trust,
2
or by his last will in writing. The eighth section of said statute
be of the like force and effect as
shall
trusts
states that implied
1148 S. E. 378 (W. Va. 1929).
229 Charles 11, 0. 3 (1676).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1930], Art. 10
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the same would have been if this statute had not been made.
True it is, that the legislature has never ingrafted said seventh
section into our law3 but that does not state what effect the courts
have given this omission.
It is maintained by a few authorities that there are two lines
of cases in this state ;' one holding that it is necessary for the express trust to be in writing in order to be effective and the other
holding otherwise. Such a generalization may be substantiated
from the general statements found in the decided cases in this
State but do the facts in each individual case justify such a
classification? Thus the purpose of this note is to determine (1),
whether there is any real contradiction in the West Virginia
cases, and, (2), whether West Virginia really holds differently
from other states which have the seventh section.
Before noticing the facts of the various cases in attempting to
answer the above questions, it will be useful to point out the
verbal distinctions in express, resulting, and constructive trusts
usually employed by courts.
The eminent jurist, Judge Story, in speaking of an express
trust, says: "Three things are indispensable to constitute a valid
trust; first, sufficient words to raise it, secondly, a definite subject, and thirdly, a certain or ascertained object.'"
While on
the other hand, resulting trusts are implied by the courts, because
the parties involved are presumed to have intended them. They
are based on the fundamental notion that one is presumed not
to give away his property. Constructive trusts are created -by the
courts, for the purpose of preventing the unjust enrichment of
the holder of a trust, usually the legal title; as for example, in
cases of meditated fraud, imposition, notice of an adverse equity,
violation of a special confidential relation, and solicitation.6
Keeping in mind the above distinctions as a back ground to the
cases on this subject, we shall discuss whether or not the seventh
section of the statute of frauds has been read into our law.
The following are facts of cases which held that express trusts
are not subject to the statute of frauds:
In the Carter Case A conveyed her house and lot to B, her
son. B conveyed it without a monetary consideration to C, another son of A's. C sold the property and this suit is brought
to compel C to account to A. These facts establish a constructive trust, resulting from the violation of a fiduciary relationship
3 BARNES W. Va. CODE, 1923, Ch. 98,
4 31 W. VA. L. QuA. 166.
5 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §964
0 BOGERT ON TRUSTS, 43.

§1.
(12th ed).
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based on the close relationship of the parties which alone would
justify the result reached in jurisdictions where the statute of
frauds does not operate.' Then, too, there is not anything in the
case to constitute an express trust.
In Tanner v. McOreary," A and B orally agreed to purchase
certain lots. Each paid his share of the purchase price. A took
legal title to said lots. Hamilton v. MbKinney 9 is a similar case.
There C sold certain land to A. A orally agreed with B that they
would purchase it together. Thereby B paid two-thirds of the
purchase price. In both cases the decrees gave to each an interest in proportion to what he had paid. In each case, the facts
establish resulting trusts since each paid his part of the purchase
price. Thus entirely apart from the statute of frauds the same
result would have been reached. This is true in states where
the seventh section exists. 10
In Bennett v. Bennett,"' A owned a half interest in land which
had to be sold for debts; B, brother of A's husband, made a
written contract with A to buy it at the sale and when said
land was resold, she was to get half of the profits. The written
agreement here took care of any requirement that an express
trust must be in writing in order to be effective. Therefore
this case would have been upheld in states where the statute
operates.
In Hudkins v. Crim,'2 A gave two deeds of trust on a certain
tract of land to secure two debts due to B. Before said property
was sold, A and B. orally agreed that B. would buy the land for
A and hold it for him until A paid him the purchase price. Also
in Swick v. Rease 13 a commissioner was appointed to sell certain
land of one H to satisfy a former judgment. Before the sale, A
became the owner of the land in question, assumed and has since
held possession thereof. The commissioner advised sale of said
land and before sale, he had B orally promise to buy said
land for A at the judicial sale for a nominal sum and convey it
to A when he became able to pay. In these two cases, the facts
466, 106 S. W. 300 (1907); Hanson v.
7 Cyrus v. Holbrook, 32 Ky.
Svarverud, 15 N. D. 550, 120 N. W. 550 (1909); Meek v. Meek, 79 Ore.

579, 156 Pae. 250 (1916).

s 88 W. Va. 658, 107 S. E. 405 (1921).
q 52 W. Va. 317, 43 S. E. 82 (1902).
ioa-aun;e v. Sheets, 181 Cal. 119, 183 Pac. 525 (1919) ;Crawford v. Hurst
299 Ill. 503, 132 N. E. 521 (1921): Lowell v. Lowell, 185 Ia. 508, 170 N.
W. 811 (1919); Shrader v. Shrader, 119 Miss. 526, 81 So. 227 (1919);
Ahrens v. Simon, 101 Neb. 739, 164 N. W. 1051 (1917).
L192 W. Va. 391, 115 S. E. 436 (1922).
12 64 W. Va. 225, 61 S. E. 166 (1908).
1362 W. Va. 557, 58 S. E. 510 (1907).
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show the existence of pre-existing equities which are sufficient
to justify the conclusion reached in each. Such has been held in
states wher the seventh section operates.14
In Floyd v. Duffy 15 A and B orally agreed to buy certain
lots from C. The title to said lots was to be taken in A's name.
Neither was to pay anything to C until the lots were resold.
Here the court emphasized the existence of an independent equity
and also the presence of a partnership either of which would
remove the bar of the statute of frauds in States where the statute exists.1"
In Boggs v. Yates,'7 A was old and feeble and shortly before his death he wanted to transfer his lots to B, his wife. Upon
C, his daughter, orally agreeing to reconvey the lots to B, A
conveyed them to C. Here was present a confidential relationship, the breach of which constituted a constructive trust and at
the same time A was not on equal ground with C, being old and
feeble.18 Thus, the same conclusions would have been reached in
each of the above instances in jurisdictions which require express
trusts to be in writing.
Before drawing any further conclusions as to the soundness of
the court's reasoning, the facts of the cases which held that the
statute of frauds does operate as to express trusts will be set
forth; they are as follows:
In Troll v. Carter,5 A conveyed land to B, his father, in trust
for A for life; then to the heirs of A.
In Pusey v. Gardzer,0 A conveyed certain realty to B, her
14 Straser v. Carroll, 125 Ark. 34, 187 S. W. 1058 (1916); Jones V.
Luffman, 148 Ga. 770, 98 S. E. 262 (1919); Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177
(1877) ; Doom v. Brown, 171 Ky. 469, 188 S. W. 475 (1916); Grumley v.
Webb, 44 Mo. 444 (1869); moore v. De Bernardi, 47 'ev. 33, 213 Pac. 1041
(1923); Peppard Realty Co. r. Enden, 241 N. Y. 588, 150 N. E. 566
(1925); Day v. Devitt, 79 N. J. Eq. 342, 81 Atl. 368 (1911); Harras v.
Harras, 60 Wash. 258, 110 Pac. 1085 (1910).
1568 W. Va. 339, 69 S. E. 993 (1911).
18Koyer v. Millmon, 150 Cal. 785, 90 P. 135 (1908); Roley v. Calehour,
135 111. 300, 25 N. E. 777 (1890) ; Hodge v. Twitchell, 33 Minn. 389 23
N. W. 547 (1885); Merchant v. Smith, 91 Ore. 442, 178 Pac. 939 (1919);
Weirich v. Dodge, 101 Wis. 621, 77 N. W. 906 (1899); Turner v. Sawyer,
150 U. S. 578 (1893).
17101 W. Va. 407, 132 S. E. 876 (1926).
is Crabtree u. Potter, 150 Cal. 710, 89 Pac. 971 (1907) ; Jenkins v. Lane,
154 Ga. 454, 115 S. E. 126 (1922); Hughes v. Fargo Loan Agency, 46 N.
D. 26, 178 N. W. 993 (1920) ; Walters v. Walters, 26 N. MK.22, 188 Pac.
1105 (1920).
19 15 W. Va. 567 (1879).
2021 W. Va. 469 (1883).
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father, to hold in trust for A.
In Poling v. Williams,21 A agreed to sell B certain land and
to have set aside a deed made by a conveying the said land to 0,
A's brother. A had, before the above agreement, conveyed the
land to C, in oral trust for A. B sued A for specific performance.
In Hawkinberry v. Metz,2 2 A by deed conveyed land to B, her
daughter in trust for A. No consideration was paid by B.
And in Crawford v. Workman 3 A conveyed a tract of land
to B, his son, in trust for A. At time of said conveyance, B paid
$168 consideration.
In the first four cases above, the court held that the parol
agreement would violate the general rule of law, that parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary, add to or contradict a written contract, in addition t osaying that it would violate the statute of frauds. Such reasoning is unsound and may be dispensed
with by stating that there is no real inconsistency between the
that the parol evidence rule
deed and the parol agreement, and
2
has nothing to do with the case.
In comparing the above two lines of cases we find that there
is no real contradiction' in the West Virginia cases; and that
West Virginia does not actually hold differently from other
states which have the seventh section. The reason why West Virginia and other states reach the same conclusion is that each
state is afraid of oral evidence. It is true that West Virginia
must talk differently from the other states because of the absence of a statute. Thus after our court has reached a conclusion, it will often refer to the absence of the seventh section
of the section of frauds. This, however, only amounts to obiter
dicta and as a practical matter the court has read into our law
the said section.
There is an exception to the above conclusion: this is where A
conveys land to B without B giving any consideration, in oral
2
trust for C. Dicta to that effect are found in Troll v. Carter,1
and Carter v. Workman.20 However, it could be argued that in
such a case the West Virginia court is applying the rule relat2155 W. Va. 69, 46 S. E. 704 (1904).
2291 W. Va. 637, 114 S. E. 240 (1922).
23 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322 (1908).
24In re. Fisk, 81 Conn. 433, 71 AtI. 559 (1908); Strain v. Hinds, 277
Ill. 598, 115 N. E. 563 (1917); Richards v. Wilson, 185 Ind. 335, 112 N.
E. 780 (1816) ; Backmann v. Huett. 21 Wyo. 332, 184 Pac. 709 (1919).
Dooley v. Baynes, 86 Va. 644, 10 S. E. 974 (1890).
27. Stupra n. 19.
'c Supra. n. 23.
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ing to the statute of wills which gives rise to a constructive trust
resulting from the mere breach of promise.27 Such would be a
reasonable view to take and thereby renders the exception inoperative.
H. G. MUNTZING

TnE STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN RuLE.-Plaintiff's decedent was
killed by one of defendant's passenger trains at a country road
crossing. The train was backing to the crossing. Some of the
gas lights in the two rear passenger coaches were lit, two red
signal light markers on the rear of the train were burning and
there was a lantern back a foot within the vestibule of the rear
coach. Decedent was familiar with the crossing and his nineteen-year old daughter was driving. The night was dark and
foggy. The view of the track was partly obstructed by buildings.
The automobile did not stop at the crossing. Fifty feet from the
track vision was uninterrupted for 999 feet, and twenty feet from
the crossing vision was uninterrupted for 3200 feet. Held, one
approaching a crossing is under no duty to look and listen for
approaching trains, if to do so would avail him nothing as a
warning, and as to whether it would have so availed him, is a
question for the jury. Morris' Administrator v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, 148 S. E. 547 (W. Va., 1929.)
There are three generally recognized classes of decisions in regard to the duty of the motorist to stop, look and listen before
crossing a railroad track. 29 WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY 274.
The first is the so-called Pennsylvania Rule, by which one who
fails to stop, look and listen before crossing a railroad track is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Serfas v.
Lehigk and New England Railroad, 270 Pa. 306, 113 Atl. 370.
Benner v. Plbiladelphia and Reading Railway, 262 Pa. 307, 105
Atl. 283. Under the second rule a failure to look and listen is
negligence per se, but it is not absolutely necessary to stop.
Little Rock Railroad Companj v. Blewitt, 65 Ark, 235, 45 S. W.
548; Castle v. Director General of Railroads, 232 N. Y. 430,
134 N. E. 334.
The third rule requires only such care as is exercised by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
-7 Hillyer v. Hynes, 33 Cal. App. 506, 165 Pae. 718 (1917); Brooks v.
Gretz, 313 Ill.290, 145 N. E. 96 (1924); Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456,
230 S. E. 906 (1921). Crinkley v. Rogers, 100 Neb. 647, 160 N. W. 974
(1916).
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